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Some days, I think I am a consequentialist; some days, I am sure I am
not. Is it simply that I cannot make up my mind? Or is it that the mean-
ing of consequentialism refuses to stay still? One thing seems sure: An
approach to ethics that seems by turns as if it must be right, as if it cannot
be right, and as if it misconceives the crucial questions shows all the signs
of striking a deep philosophical chord.
I.
Samuel Scheffler feels the pull of consequentialism, and he feels the
pull against it. In The Rejection of Consequentialism," a book that has
been eagerly awaited by moral philosophers, he tries to construct a moral
theory that retains the strengths of consequentialism, but that at the same
time avoids the powerful objections against it, by incorporating a crucial
feature of nonconsequentialist views. This is an ambitious project, not be-
cause of its commonsense conclusions, but because of its aim of building a
new theory out of parts of incompatible theories. In light of these ambi-
tions, it is hardly a criticism to say that the project does not completely
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succeed. Like consequentialism, Scheffler's "hybrid" theory' seems some-
times persuasive and at other times to have missed the mark. It is worth
understanding why.
Consequentialism is not so much a moral theory as a class of moral
theories. All such theories hold some kind of stuff to be intrinsically good
and define rightness-right action-in terms of that good. Thus, the right-
ness of an action depends on its consequences, on the extent to which it
produces goodness. In the typical form with which Scheffler is concerned,
consequentialism says that right action is action that maximizes the good.
Classical utilitarianism holds pleasure or happiness to be the sole intrinsic
good; in modern utilitarianism, the good is preference-satisfaction. These
are paradigmatic consequentialist theories. In principle, however, conse-
quentialism is open as to the content of the good. A theory is consequen-
tialist by virtue of its structure-by virtue of the way the concepts of the
good and the right are defined. Goodness is prior (logically or concep-
tually), and rightness is dependent on goodness.
Opponents of consequentialism argue that some actions are right even
though they do not maximize the good. But this assertion is ambiguous. It
can mean either that it is sometimes wrong to maximize the good, or that
it is not always wrong not to maximize the good. Although these state-
ments obviously have different meanings, each expresses an objection to
consequentialism. The first is rooted in what we may call old-fashioned
deontology; the second responds to the extremely strong demands conse-
quentialism seems to make on agents.
The deontological objection provides the traditional contrast to conse-
quentialism. Whereas the latter understands rightness as that which max-
imizes goodness, the deontologist says that some actions are wrong even
though they maximize the good. Rightness, in this view, is not dependent,
or at least not wholly dependent, on goodness.
Like its rival, deontology names not a theory but a class of theories:
those that understand rightness as at least partly independent of goodness.
But deontological views may vary as to the degree of independence. The
"absolutist" variety, which is probably the most familiar, holds that some
actions are wrong regardless of the consequences of not doing them. The
absolutist might not allow torturing one innocent child to save the world.'
But there are deontological views more moderate than the "whatever the
consequences" variety; one might agree that any action could be justified if
the consequences of not doing it were bad enough, but still insist that it is
2. P. 5.
3. This question is harder than Ivan's in The Brothers Karamazov, who asks whether torturing
"to death only one little creature" would be permissible to make human beings happy. F. DOSTOYEV-
SKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 291 (C. Garnett trans. 1950).
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sometimes wrong to maximize the good.' Thus, a deontologist might allow
killing one person to save the world but still maintain that it would be
wrong to kill one person to save five, or even fifty, or to prevent someone
else from murdering five or fifty. In a standard example, we are to sup-
pose that the sheriff of a small town can prevent a riot in which hundreds
of people will be killed only by framing an innocent person whose blood
the mob is demanding. The deontologist says that the sheriff may not so
act, even to prevent the great evil he knows will ensue. There are some
things you may not do. But the consequentialist, it seems, cannot rule out
anything in advance: It all depends on what promotes the good or mini-
mizes the bad.
Most of us have fairly strong "intuitions" (in the jargon of contempo-
rary moral philosophy) that the kinds of actions just described would be
wrong, and when confronted with these hard cases, the consequentialist
can usually come up with good consequentialist reasons for not allowing
the repugnant deeds.5 But since philosophers can tell their stories in ways
that force the issue,6 the consequentialist will sometimes be forced to ap-
prove abhorrent actions.
At this point we may not know what to think. Perhaps in those circum-
stances it would be justifiable to do what the consequentialist approves.
Perhaps our reluctance is a spillover from those cases in which the ques-
tionable act would clearly not be right, or perhaps it is a vestige of our
deontological upbringing. Yet we are pulled the other way too: Even if the
consequentialist gives the right answer, he seems to give the wrong reason.
Even if knowingly framing the innocent always has bad consequences, we
feel convinced that bad consequences are not the whole source of its
wrongness. Let us call this conviction, the idea behind the view that it is
sometimes wrong to maximize the good, the deontological objection to
consequentialism.'
The other standard objection to consequentialism is more straightfor-
ward, at least in appearance.8 If I am morally required always to produce
4. Cf J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1971) (deontological theories do not "characterize the
rightness of institutions and acts independently from their consequences. All ethical doctrines worth
our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be
irrational, crazy."). Rawls' view diverges from the older, more common definition given by Broad:
"Deontological theories hold that there are ethical propositions of the form: 'Such and such a kind of
action would always be right (or wrong) in such and such circumstances, no matter what its conse-
quences might be.'" C. BROAD, FIVE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY 206 (1931).
5. For example, he may argue that the institutions of justice, necessary for human well-being, will
be undermined, or that killing induces bad traits of character.
6. They will say, for example, that no one will ever find out what the sheriff did, or that the
sheriff will die of a heart attack five minutes later and his character will go no further.
7. P. 83; I. KANT, FOUNDATION OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 10 (L. Beck trans. 1959); W.
Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 17, 35-39 (1930).
8. Pp. 7, 56; Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIAN-
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the objectively best state of affairs available to me, my life will not be my
own. My own concerns and desires will be lost in the larger calculus of
goods and bads, and the shape and content of my life will be at the mercy
of that calculus. Full-time do-goodism will be my inescapable duty. This
may seem not only unrealistic, but also wrong and misguided, for human
beings will cease to be agents who are sources of choice and value, and
become machines that churn out the good. As a result, consequentialism
seems to undermine our integrity as agents. Call this-the idea behind the
view that it is not always wrong not to maximize the good-the objection
from integrity.
Scheffler's purpose is to construct a moral theory that avoids consequen-
tialism's violation of personal integrity, while preserving what he takes to
be its "deeply plausible-sounding feature," the idea that "one may always
do what would lead to the best available outcome overall." 9 Thus, he re-
jects the deontological objection; but he seeks to free agents from the re-
quirement always to maximize the good.
The differences between consequentialism, deontology, and Scheffler's
hybrid theory can easily be displayed. On the now-common understanding
of consequentialism-and, more important, on Scheffler's understand-
ing-the consequentialist believes that:
(i) One is always morally required to maximize the good.
It follows, of course, that:
(ii) One is always morally permitted to maximize the good.
The deontologist denies both of these propositions; he denies (i) because
he denies (ii), holding that:
(iii) One is not always morally required to maximize the good
and, more important, that:
(iv) One is not always morally permitted to maximize the good.
With the consequentialist, Scheffler holds (ii), thus denying (iv); with the
deontologist, he holds (iii), thus denying (i).
The aim of Scheffler's book is to justify the departure from consequen-
tialism that goes as far as (iii) but that stops short of the deontological
ISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75, 108-18 (1973).
9. P. 4.
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premise of (iv). In his terms, he is defending the "agent-centered preroga-
tives" expressed by (iii) but rejecting the "agent-centered restrictions" ex-
pressed by (iv). So he must find a "theoretical rationale"'1 for prerogatives
that does not also entail restrictions, and he must show further that there
is no other rationale for restrictions.
Scheffler goes to great lengths to argue against the view that there is no
middle ground: Either you are a consequentialist, who believes one is
morally required to maximize the good, or you are a deontologist, who
believes one is sometimes required not to. One might wonder why anyone
would want to take the middle road. The simple, if somewhat tautological
answer is that the idea that one may always maximize the good seems
persuasive, but a moral requirement to this effect is absurd. The difficulty
for Scheffler is to find a rationale for this view that does not concede so
much as to abandon the consequentialist framework altogether.
II.
The idea that one is always morally obligated to produce the best avail-
able state of affairs, Scheffler argues, ignores a crucial feature of persons;
it ignores the "independence of the personal point of view."11 Consequen-
tialism "requires the agent to treat the concerns generated from his point
of view as altogether dependent for their moral significance" on their
weight in an impersonal ranking of states of affairs. 2 It mandates that
one not give one's own interests any more weight in deciding what to do
than one gives other people's interests. But a person "cares differentially
about his projects just because they are his projects." 3 And a moral the-
ory, Scheffler thinks, should take account of this fact: not just for prag-
matic reasons or because of what it tells us about "the nature of human
fulfillment"' 4 (the good will be maximized if people are allowed to care
about their projects out of proportion to their weight in an impersonal
calculus), but also because of its connection with "the character of per-
sonal agency and motivation."' 5 What is at stake here is integrity in the
literal rather than the more familiar moral sense. A person cannot be di-
vorced from his projects and plans-cannot view them simply as projects
or plans belonging to someone, it matters not whom--without ceasing to
be a whole human being.'"
10. Id. Scheffler speaks at various places of finding a "principled" or "theoretical rationale" or






16. Williams, supra note 8, at 116-17 (describing nexus between personal integrity and priority of
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Of course, a consequentialist theory can count integrity as a good, and
so take account of this feature of persons. The consequentialist will then
seek the preservation of integrity; he will aim at increasing the number of
people successfully carrying out their projects and plans.1" But such a
strategy is prey to just the objections it is designed to avoid: When sacrific-
ing my integrity maximizes integrity overall, I am required to sacrifice
it."8 That it is my integrity can have no special moral significance for me;
"the moral significance of a personal point of view, with its accompanying
commitments and concerns, is entirely exhausted by the weight that point
of view carries in the impersonal calculus, even for the person who has the
point of view."' 9
A moral theory can best take account of the independence of the per-
sonal point of view, Scheffler argues, not by counting it as a good to be
maximized, but by "reflecting" it, "by freeing people from the demand
that their actions and motives always be optimal from the impersonal per-
spective, and by allowing them to devote attention to their projects and
concerns to a greater extent than impersonal optimality by itself would
allow."2 The rationale, then, for an agent-centered prerogative is that it
is the best way to incorporate a concern for the independence and integrity
of the person. But this rationale does not justify agent-centered restric-
tions. It explains why people do not have to do what is best, but it gives
no reason for thinking they should not if they want to:
Thus there might be an agent who willingly sacrificed his own
projects for the greater good; on [Scheffier's] view his conduct would
be supererogatory. Or there might be an agent whose project simply
was to bring about the best state of affairs; this project would be in
no way ruled out by the agent-centred prerogative . . . if someone
wants to bring about the best state of affairs . . . there is no reason
from the standpoint of personal integrity to forbid that. Such a per-
son is surely not alienated "from his actions and the source of his
action in his own convictions."'"
Scheffier considers arguments for the deontological view and concludes
that the "prima-facie difficulties with agent-centred restrictions" cannot be
overcome.22 He finds "an apparent air of irrationality surrounding the
one's own projects).
17. See pp. 58-60.
18. And, given the extent of deprivation in the world, this is no mere hypothetical: People will
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claim that some acts are so objectionable that one ought not to perform
them even if this means that more equally weighty acts of the very same
kind or other comparably objectionable events will ensue .... "23 Schef-
fier can find no way to dispel this air of irrationality. It is clear that we
cannot explain why some actions are wrong simply by assigning them
very high disvalue, 24 and generally, Scheffler argues, all strategies
designed to justify deontological restrictions founder in just the way ap-
peals to the disvalue of reprehensible actions do. Whatever it is that makes
these actions reprehensible, it is odd to prohibit them even in cases where
their purpose is to prevent more such actions.
Of course, the plausibility of rejecting deontological constraints, and of
concluding that one is always permitted to maximize the good, depends
partly on what one takes to be the good. The conception of the good em-
bodied in classical utilitarianism and its modern variants, for example,
may seem unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, one may believe that
pleasure or happiness or want-satisfaction is not the only intrinsic good;
one may think that integrity is a good, that there are intrinsic aesthetic or
intellectual goods, or that motives themselves-independently of what they
produce-can be good (sympathy or love) or bad (spite or malice). Second,
one may believe that the distribution of goodness matters as much as the
amount of goodness produced. In principle, standard utilitarianism per-
mits and even requires ignoring the misery of a few in favor of "the
pleasures of the many in order that total aggregate satisfaction or utility
might be maximized. '2 5 Utilitarianism is morally indifferent as between a
world in which some have a lot and others have very little, and a world in
which goods are more equally distributed, if total utility is the same. The
utilitarian will often have good utilitarian reasons for preferring more
egalitarian distributions-for example, decreasing marginal utility-but
he can have no reason for preferring them intrinsically.
But these are problems for standard utilitarianism, not necessarily for
all consequentialist theories. A consequentialist can easily enough count
"things" other than pleasure or want-satisfaction as intrinsic goods.2"
Scheffler's account is in this respect completely abstract; he does not reveal




26. For example, a consequentialist can maintain that some actions are good as well as right, that
is, that some actions have intrinsic value. What distinguishes consequentialism is not its catalogue of
the good, but its subjugation of the right. An action may be right because it produces good, or because
it exemplifies the good, but its rightness must somehow depend on goodness; there is, for consequen-
tialism, no such thing as intrinsic rightness.
27. P. 28.
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He is much more specific about the matter of distribution. Unlike the
utilitarian, Scheffler's conception of the good is inherently "distribution-
sensitive." The weight he accords to benefiting a person increases as that
person's relative well-being decreases.28 But this principle is less stringent
than, for example, Rawls': It does not accord absolute priority to benefit-
ing the least advantaged.29
III.
The view that one is always morally required to produce the objectively
best state of affairs available is about as familiar to students of moral
philosophy as utilitarianism itself. And yet-what an extraordinary idea!
One of the defects of Scheffler's extremely abstract approach is that he
takes this idea completely for granted-takes it without question as the
baseline from which deviations must be justified. But instead of asking
whether a "departure" from this view can be given a "principled ration-
ale," one might more sensibly begin by asking whether the view itself is
credible.30
If consequentialism implies that one is morally required to maximize
the good, we must wonder why the classical utilitarians-Bentham, Mill,
Sidgwick-seemed to have been largely untroubled by the kinds of criti-
cisms plaguing contemporary consequentialists. They do not seem to have
worried that utilitarianism would make unreasonable demands on the in-
dividual. One possible explanation, of course, is that they were prepared
to accept the consequences of consequentialism. This explanation, how-
ever, is implausible on its face: The original utilitarians were down-to-
earth, practical men who aimed to do as little violence as possible to com-
monsense beliefs. There is, in addition, a great deal of direct evidence that
they did not think utilitarianism required the heroic exertions ascribed to
it by modern critics.
28. See pp. 26-31.
29. See J. RAWIL, supra note 4, at 14-15. It might be argued that to incorporate a distributive
principle into a moral theory is to depart from consequentialism to that extent, as it might be argued
that there are some "things" a consequentialist cannot count as goods and still remain a consequen-
tialist. I consider these arguments briefly at infra pp. 561-62. For most of this essay, however, I will
not challenge Scheffler's assumption that some distributions can be preferred within the consequential-
ist framework, on grounds of their intrinsic betterness.
30. According to Brian Barry, G.E. Moore was the first to identify rightness with the maximiza-
tion of goodness. Barry, And Who Is My Neighbor?, 88 YALE L.J. 629, 639 n.37 (1979). Moore
maintained that "the assertion 'I am morally bound to perform this action' is identical with the asser-
tion 'this action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe.'" G. MOORE,
PRINCIPIA ETHICA 147 (1903). Barry describes this view as "the time-bomb that has been ticking
away ever since" and that "has at last blown up utilitarianism." Barry, supra, at 639 n.7. But the
maximization view seems implicit in the idea of consequentialism itself and has been asserted occa-
sionally even by the original utilitarians: "[A] Utilitarian must hold that it is always wrong for a man
knowingly to do anything other than what he believes to be most conducive to Universal Happiness."
H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 492 (1907).
The Yale Law Journal
In the first place, the utilitarians believed that individuals had limited
power to affect the welfare of large numbers of people. In general, they
thought, the effects of individuals' actions were confined within a fairly
narrow range:
The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics,
the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in
a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale-in
other words, to be a public benefactor-are but exceptional; and on
these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in
every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few
persons, is all he has to attend to.31
If my world consists of those nearest and dearest to me, I will not often be
called on to sacrifice my own interests, for at least two reasons. First, my
interests and the interests of those dearest to me will often coincide. In
addition, those nearest and dearest to anyone who thinks about utilitarian-
ism (or any other moral theory) are likely to be reasonably well off, so
that concern for their welfare will not be so demanding. If my world con-
sists not of sick and starving millions but only of the people around me,
the view that "generally speaking, each man is better able to provide for
his own happiness than for that of other persons"" is highly plausible.
The utilitarians' belief in the limited power of individuals to "do much
good to more than a very small number of persons"33 still does not com-
pletely rebut the charge that utilitarianism demands too much. After all,
one could, it seems clear, do more good by becoming a nurse and going off
to Somalia or Bangladesh than by teaching in a university; Mill and Sidg-
wick could not, it seems, have denied such facts. They must instead have
gotten around them. But how?
To answer this question we must look at classical utilitarianism in its
original context, not as the abstract philosophical theory it has since be-
come, but as the work of politically engaged thinkers who tried to give a
theoretical foundation to their progressive social views. There are several
related ways in which this understanding of what Bentham, Mill, and
Sidgwick were about helps explain the puzzle before us.
In the first place, against the harsh, rule-bound deontological moralities
that came before it, utilitarianism, with pleasure as its centerpiece, could
easily look too soft and yielding. The utilitarians insisted, moreover, that
there was nothing intrinsically good about self-sacrifice; there was no vir-
31. J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 19 (G. Sher ed. 1979).
32. H. SIDGWICK, supra note 30, at 431.
33. Id at 434.
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tue in denial per se.34 So against what had come before, utilitarianism
could seem to suggest more relaxation than repression.
More important, the utilitarians conceived their theory as applying in
the first instance to the organization of society rather than directly to indi-
viduals. Even if they were not clearly rule-utilitarians, they often sounded
like rule-utilitarians.3 5 The rule-utilitarian does not ask, "What should I
do- (to maximize the good), given the world as it is?," but rather, "What
rules ought to govern human conduct and the organization of society?"
Focusing on the latter question lifts many of the burdens of consequential-
ism, for several reasons. First, the burdens are spread around; the individ-
ual need not bear the brunt of everyone else's negligence. Second, some
burdens may be diminished just by being shared, either because beneficial
feelings of solidarity are fostered, or because some of the usual costs of
deprivation (like envy) are decreased if no one else has what one does not
have. Finally, emphasizing general rules for social institutions forces one
to pay attention to what is reasonable to expect of typical human beings.3 6
In addition to the general emphasis on the structure of social institu-
tions, there is the tendency, noted by Sidgwick, "which Utilitarian ethics
have always shown to pass over into politics. For one who values conduct
in proportion to its felicific consequences will naturally set a higher esti-
mate on effective beneficence in public affairs than on the purest manifes-
tation of virtue in the details of private life . . . ." What is wanted is
not personal self-sacrifice but promotion of the general welfare.
For these reasons, then, the classical utilitarians were not bothered by
the objection that plagues their descendants and around which Scheffler
has built his theory. What explains the difference? In the early twentieth
century, moral philosophy took an arid and asocial turn; when it was
34. J. MILL, supra note 31, at 15-16.
35. An early explanation of the distinction (not explicit in the classical utilitarians) between act-
and rule-utilitarianism, can be found in Urmson, The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J. S.
Mill, 3 PHIL. Q. 33, 35-39 (1953). Urmson argues that Mill was a rule-utilitarian, and this is proba-
bly now the common view. But see Mabbott, Interpretations of Mill's 'Utilitarianism,' 6 PHIL. Q.
115, 116-19 (1956) (challenging Urmson's interpretation).
36. Thus in defending the view that people may show partiality to those near and dear, and need
not be strictly impartial in distributing their beneficence, Sidgwick argues:
that most persons are only capable of strong affections towards a few human beings in certain
close relations, especially the domestic and that if these were suppressed, what they would feel
towards their fellow-creatures generally would be, as Aristotle says, "but a watery kindness"
and a very feeble counterpoise to self-love: so that such specialised affections as the present
organisation of society normally produces afford the best means of developing in most persons
a more extended benevolence ....
H. SIDGWICK, supra note 30, at 434. Sidgwick is obviously concerned here not with what an individ-
ual calculating in isolation should do, but with the sorts of social institutions most likely to promote
general utility. Yet Sidgwick is often taken to be an act-utilitarian. But see J. SCHNEEWIND, SIDG-
WICK'S ETHICS AND VICTORIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 340-49 (1977) (challenging this classification
and suggesting that distinction between act- and rule-utilitarianism is too simple).
37. H. SIDGWICK, supra note 30, at 495.
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utilitarian at all, it retained only the broad and abstract features of classi-
cal utilitarianism and shed its subtleties: its political sense, its moral psy-
chology, its understanding of human nature and social relations. Utilitari-
anism developed, for the most part, as a view about what an individual in
isolation should do, and all that remained was the bare principle: maxi-
mize the good."8 As meta-ethics prevailed over ethics, it was held that
moral philosophy consists in the analysis of moral concepts, rather than
anything that might directly affect one's life. It was easy enough to say
that maximizing the good was obligatory-and unlikely that one's actual
commitment to this view would be tested.
Scheffler takes seriously the logical extension of consequentialism that
twentieth-century analytic philosophy has made central. He shares some
of the flaws of that tradition, notably its extremely abstract approach.
Thus he accepts unquestionably its "problematic," instead of at least not-
ing the oddity or wondering at the origins of this consequentialist impera-
tive. At the same time, however, he belongs to a generation of philoso-
phers who are concerned about the implications of ethical theories for
living one's life. The convergence of these two approaches is the driving
force behind Scheffler's work.
IV.
There is yet another reason why the classical utilitarians were not beset
by the problems Scheffler faces. A consequentialist must say that rightness
depends on goodness, but it is a further step to say that rightness consists
in maximizing goodness. Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick all express views
that diverge from this strong position. According to Bentham, for instance,
to say that an action is right, or at least not wrong, is to say that it is
"conformable to the principle of utility,"3 " and this means that "the ten-
dency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than
any it has to diminish it."40 Thus, an action can be right even though
other actions would have been even better. Mill and Sidgwick explicitly
distinguish between obligatory and praiseworthy acts.41 All these views
38. The argument that rule-utilitarianism collapses into act-utilitarianism reinforces this abstract
and individualistic tendency. See D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 62-118 (1965).
39. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 3 (1907).
40. Id.
41. Mill characterizes the willingness to sacrifice one's own happiness for others as "the highest
virtue which can be found in man." J. MILL, supra note 31, at 16. This suggests the distinction he
makes elsewhere between conduct that is morally obligatory and conduct that we wish for or admire
people for, but do not hold to be morally binding. Id. at 48.
Sidgwick, while admitting that the "distinction between Excellence and Strict Duty does not seem
properly admissible in Utilitarianism," argues that it is
practically expedient . . . to retain, in judging even the strictly voluntary conduct of others, the
distinction between a part that is praiseworthy and a part that is merely right: because it is
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imply that to be true to consequentialism, one must hold that goodness,
and nothing else, determines rightness but just how much goodness one
needs for rightness is an open question. More specifically, the consequen-
tialist must hold that the more goodness an action produces, the "righter"
it is,42 but he need not maintain that for an action to be "merely right," in
Sidgwick's phrase 4 -that is, morally acceptable-it must be optimal.
The consequentialist, then, can draw the line between rightness and
wrongness-between what is permitted and what is not-far down from
the optimal. Where he draws the line will depend on his views about
human nature, his expectations of it, and, no doubt, his own tempera-
ment. As Mill observes, t~e consequentialist can be "puritanically rigor-
ous" or "as indulgent as can possibly be desired by sinner or
sentimentalist.
'44
This strategy may appear to be a simple solution to Scheffler's problem.
For he is consequentialist enough, it seems, to agree that rightness de-
pends on goodness; he wants only to deny that one is always obligated to
maximize goodness. Why not draw the line of rightness, then, some dis-
tance down from the optimal, making saintliness and heroism recom-
mended, but not required? For this, it seems, no principled rationale is
needed.
But this approach will not help Scheffler; in seeing why, we discover
problems with his view. On the line of reasoning just described, although
it is permissible not to maximize the good, it is always preferable to bring
more good into the world than not. Would Scheffler agree? What he says
explicitly is just that one is permitted to maximize the good, as one is
permitted not to. But his conception of persons and human agency and
motivation implies something stronger. Something of ultimate value would
be lost if people could not pursue their projects, could not live their lives
according to their own scheme of value, and were instead always obligated
to maximize the good. The natural conclusion is that it is not merely all
right not to maximize the good; it is somehow better not to.
Scheffler wishes to allow maximizing the good so that those rare self-
sacrificing or naturally altruistic souls may, like everyone else, pursue
their projects, which happen to consist of maximizing the good.4 5 On
natural to us to compare any individual's character or conduct, not with our highest
ideal-Utilitarian or otherwise-but with a certain average standard and to admire what rises
above the standard . ...
H. SIDGWICK, supra note 30, at 492.
42. J. MILL, supra note 31, at 7 ("[A]ctions are right in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness.").
43. H. SIDGWICK, supra note 30, at 492.
44. J. MILL, supra note 31, at 20.
45. See supra p. 549.
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Scheffler's assumptions, this is a good reason to permit them to maximize
the good, but it is not clear why anyone for whom maximizing the good is
not a project ought be permitted to do so. A person with less saintly
projects who maximizes the good will thereby forsake his integrity. It
seems, then, that Scheffler ought to conclude that some people ought not
maximize the good, or that one is morally prohibited from doing so unless
that happens to be one's project.4
It is impossible to penetrate these murky matters further without a bet-
ter understanding of the nature of projects and the pull moral beliefs have
on us. Scheffler does not discuss these issues in any detail, although he
does deny that one's projects always take priority over objective goodness
and badness. 47 But he does not explain how, except in the case of the saint
or the altruist, moral beliefs become integrated into one's personality. I
have my personal projects, but I may also believe that maximizing the
good is desirable. Can I believe it is good or right without having some
desire to do it? Is that enough to make it one of my projects? How do I fit
it in with my other concerns? If I do not believe in maximizing the good,
even more if I think it is wrong, then maximizing the good would violate
my integrity in an obvious way.
However these issues are resolved, Scheffler's concern with integrity
dictates a stronger conclusion than that one is permitted not to maximize
the good. The language of permissions and prohibitions seems inadequate
to these issues, but it is unfortunately the only language Scheffler uses.
Given his views about integrity, and given people as they are (unsaintly
and only moderately altruistic), the world in which people pursue their
own projects and do not maximize the good is not just a second-best con-
cession to realism; it is morally superior to the world in which they sacri-
fice their projects to maximize the good. But to admit this, it seems, is to
abandon consequentialism altogether; it is to move beyond just allowing
people not to maximize the good, and in the direction of recommending
against it.
V.
It is not obvious why the independence of agent-centered prerogatives
46. This conclusion looks paradoxical. It seems peculiar to prohibit people from maximizing the
good: Prohibitions against doing something are necessary only where there is some desire to do what is
prohibited; only those whose project is to maximize the good have the requisite desire; those people,
however, are exempt from the prohibition, for maximizing the good does not jeopardize their integrity.
Thus it sounds odd to say that people are prohibited from maximizing the good, when only their own
desires sustain the prohibition. But there is no real paradox here. On some theories, for example, such
as egoism, one in fact ought to do what one wants to do. Such theories make right action dependent on
one's desires; if the latter changed, the former would change as well.
47. Pp. 8, 20-21.
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from agent-centered restrictions should be hard to maintain, and one is
inclined at first to wonder why Scheffmer works so hard to show that his
hybrid view does not lead to the deontologist's more radical departure
from consequentialism. Yet on further reflection it begins to seem as if the
two views, and the underlying objections to which each responds, stand or
fall together. The argument at the end of the last section is one reason for
this conclusion: If integrity is definitive of our nature as agents, then a
moral theory must do more than simply allow us to maintain it. But there
are other reasons for thinking the objection from integrity and the deonto-
logical objection go together.
Let us recall Scheffler's argument that although consequentialism can
accommodate a concern with integrity by counting it as a good to be maxi-
mized, this strategy is inferior to his own, which takes. account of integrity
in the structure of the theory itself. At the same time, Scheffier maintains
that deontological restrictions on action cannot be justified. They are not
imposed by the rationale for agent-centered prerogatives: "to protect indi-
viduals from the demand that they organize their conduct in accordance
with some canon of impersonal optimality."4 ' A prohibition against doing
so does not follow. And the question Scheffler poses to the deontologist
looks insuperably difficult:
The question is not: what is it about people that makes it objectiona-
ble for them to be victimized? But rather: what is it about a person
that makes it impermissible for him to victimize someone else even in
order to minimize victimizations which are equally objectionable
from an impersonal standpoint? 49
Put this way, the question compels thinking in terms of the impersonal
counting up of violations and choosing the course that minimizes them.
And, not surprisingly, this approach is incapable, as Scheffler argues, of
justifying agent-centered restrictions, just as it was incapable of justifying
agent-centered prerogatives. 50
But, at this point, the deontologist ought to object to the terms of the
question. He is not concerned with the impersonal standpoint; at least, he
is not concerned enough to sacrifice his convictions for it. Of course, if he
does not do the abhorrent thing, there will be more badness in the world.
But that is not the point. The deontologist believes that "each of us is
specially responsible for what he does, rather than for what other people
do." 51 This is a concern with integrity, not in Scheffler's sense of living
48. P. 94.
49. P. 100.
50. See supra pp. 549-50.
51. Williams, supra note 8, at 99; see Nagel, The Limits of Objectivity, in 1 THE TANNER LEO-
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one's life and carrying out one's projects-though the deontologist may be
concerned about this too-but in the sense of not doing what one believes
to be wrong, of not acting badly or compromising one's values. This is
integrity in its more usual sense: moral integrity.
Of course, one may find this view less than satisfactory, for just the
kinds of reasons Scheffier offers. If a certain kind of act is so awful, more
of them are even more awful. The anti-consequentialist stance may seem
even to smack of self-indulgence, of too much concern with one's own
moral purity-let the world be damned.5 2 Our problem here, however, is
not to decide the merits of this position. It is rather to see the connection
between this deontological view and Scheffler's middle ground: the defense
of agent-centered prerogatives. The difficulty is that, on the one hand, the
argument Scheffier makes in defense of his view can be made by the deon-
tologist, and, on the other, the criticism that can be made against the de-
ontologist can be made against Scheffler.
Scheffier argues that the best way to build a concern with integrity into
a moral theory is not to count it as a good among others to be maximized,
but to give it a special place, reflecting its connection with our nature as
agents, by allowing people to pursue their projects. It can be argued with
equal force that the best way to incorporate a concern with right action
into a moral theory is not to count it as a good to be maximized, but to
reflect its connection with our nature as morally responsible agents by
prohibiting certain actions and emphasizing that each person is responsi-
ble for his own conduct.
Scheffier argues that it is irrational not to allow otherwise objectionable
actions when that is the only way to prevent more of them. It can be
argued with equal force that if integrity is so important, it is irrational not
to sacrifice one's own if doing so will promote aggregate integrity.
Why is it so difficult to maintain the moral distinction between agent-
centered prerogatives and agent-centered restrictions? Not because their
TJRES ON HUMAN VALUES 75, 119-39 (S. McMurrin ed. 1980). But Williams' words are misleading.
They suggest that a person is responsible only for what he does, and not for what he omits to do.
Although the denial of consequentialism is often conjoined with the belief that the distinction between
actions and omissions is morally important, the former does not entail the latter. (Consequentialism,
however, does imply that the distinction is not morally important.) One can believe, as Williams does,
that people are especially responsible for the shape and content of their own lives, without thinking
this is a matter only of what they do and not also of what they omit to do.
52. And, despite their arguments, Nagel and Williams do not come down clearly in favor of the
anti-consequentialist answers to these moral dilemmas. See Nagel, supra note 51, at 126-35; Wil-
liams, supra note 8, at 117. They seem to be objecting more to what they see as the consequentialist's
insensitivity than to his answers-as if a consequentialist could not recognize that the awful thing one
does to prevent more awful things is not itself awful. But surely the consequentialist can recognize
this; he advocates doing the lesser of two evils, but he does not deny that the lesser is still evil. What
he cannot say is that doing the lesser evil is wrong, if to say it is wrong means, as we usually think,
that one ought not do it. It is not clear how far Nagel and Williams are from this view.
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content is indistinguishable: Certainly there is a difference between the
view that one is permitted not to maximize the good and the view that one
is required not to maximize it. The difficulty seems to come in choosing a
point of view from which to judge what is right and what is all right.
Either we judge from an impersonal, external perspective, in which case
we give the consequentialist answer, or we judge from our personal stand-
point in the world, in which case we sometimes give the nonconsequen-
tialist answer."3 It is not the specific content of Scheffier's claim, but
rather his move to the agent-centered point of view, that opens the way
for the deontologist and for the critic against both Scheffler and the deon-
tologist. But note that it is not the concern with agency per se that opens
the way for the deontologist and the critic-for a consequentialist can care
about agency"'-but the concern with one's own agency (the agent's
agency). If I may take my projects more seriously than the Impartial
Spectator would, why may I not take my moral purity more seriously too?
VI.
And yet, despite these arguments, I agree with Scheffier's conclusions:
Where one would have to do an awful thing to prevent more awful things
from being done, one may do it, that is, one may maximize the good or
minimize the bad; one is not, however, always obligated to do the objec-
tively best thing. If the above arguments are right, how can these views be
consistently maintained?
Part of the answer to this question is simple, and part is complicated.
The reason one is not obligated always to maximize the good is that there
is no good reason to think one is. The only reason to think that one is
obligated to maximize the good is the belief in consequentialism, conjoined
with the belief that a consequentialist must be committed to this view.
But, as I have argued, consequentialism does not require that one always
do the best thing; it implies only that the more good one does, the better.55
Where the line of obligatoriness is drawn, however, is an open question.
Explaining why it is not wrong to do something awful to prevent some-
thing more awful is more complicated. In part, it has to do with the great
difficulty of maintaining one's integrity when faced with such clearly un-
53. See T. NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 196-213 (1979); Nagel, supra note 51, at 135-38.
54. See supra note 26; infra p. 560.
55. There are, of course, other things we value besides doing what is right. The right thing may
not be the witty, the charming, the natural thing; one who always puts maximizing the good before all
else may seem not fully human, or deficient in other qualities we value or admire. See G. ORWELL,
Reflections on Ghandi, in COLLECTED ESSAYS 451, 459 (1961); Wolf, Moral Saints, 79 J. PHIL. 419
(1982). This point may dispel some of our dissatisfaction with the consequentialist account of the
right: Rightness is one property of actions we value, but it is not the only one, and we should not
expect rightness to include all that is worth valuing in the world or in people.
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desirable options. Since nothing one can do in these dreadful situations
seems quite right, nothing is clearly wrong either. For these extraordinary
moral dilemmas simply confront one: One must choose either to do some-
thing or to refrain, and each course is morally loaded. One's knowledge of
the terrible consequences of all choices may make proclamations about
integrity seem self-deceptive. In any case, I do not think we conceive of
such situations in terms of prohibitions at all. We are, in the end, more
humble than that; we do not presume to judge. We would criticize some-
one confronted with such a choice not for what he decided, only for how.
We would criticize him for acting too easily, for not agonizing.
There is another, more theoretical, reason for thinking it is permissible
to do something awful to prevent something more awful. Remember that
a deontological theory says that it is sometimes wrong to maximize the
good; only the absolutist version insists that one may not maximize the
good, whatever the consequences of not doing so." The absolutist does not
allow killing one person to save five, or however many. But the moderate
deontologist concedes that consequences are relevant, and he may believe
that the consequences of not killing in such a case are bad enough to
justify the killing of one. What the deontologist cannot accept is the view
that lying or breaking promises or killing is justified whenever doing so
increases total utility. Killing one person would not be justified simply
because it would make many others a bit happier.
Are we suggesting that the consequentialist must say that it would be
all right to kill a person in order to cheer up a lot of others? This is a
very crude consequentialist. He is indifferent between alternative distribu-
tions of the good, permitting the tradeoff between concentrated misery and
a little bit of contentment spread thinly around. For him, there are no
intrinsic goods that are not passive states of consciousness, like happiness
or want-satisfaction. But a consequentialist need not be crude, just as a
deontologist need not be absolutist. He can agree that certain kinds of
motives or intentions are intrinsically, and not just instrumentally, good.
The consequentialist can, furthermore, prefer some distributions of goods
and bads on intrinsic grounds. This preference can be explained partly in
terms of the "separateness of persons"" and partly in terms of the asym-
metry between goodness and badness. Because persons are separate and
because the calculus of goods and bads is additive, the individual good
may be lost in the play of arithmetic: The net good or the total good may
not be his own good. Yet we are concerned about the good of persons,
56. See supra pp. 545-46.
57. See pp. 11-12, 77-79; J. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 27-29. The emphasis in recent moral philos-
ophy on the separateness of persons has its source in Rawls' claim that "Utilitarianism does not take
seriously the distinction between persons." Id. at 27.
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separate individuals. It is impossible to avoid the tension between division
and addition entirely. But it can be avoided, in part, by counting some
kinds of well-being or some portions of the welfare continuum as more
important than others. We may call the most essential portions rights, and
we may say that they are so important that they can only be sacrificed for
the fulfillment of essential rights of others. There are other, weaker posi-
tions as well. 58 In any case, a consequentialist can by such means avoid
the absurd conclusion that it would be all right to kill a person to please
some others.
Is this still consequentialism? Clearly Scheffler thinks it is.59 He does
not see this aspect of his view-the acceptance of a distributive princi-
ple-as a departure from consequentialism. If he did, he almost certainly
would have rejected consequentialism altogether, so as not to be saddled
with conclusions that have long embarrassed utilitarians."0 But it might be
argued that one cannot build just anything into the good and still mean-
ingfully describe one's theory as consequentialist. If this disagreement is to
be more than the insistence by the consequentialist that he can say this or
that is intrinsically good, and the insistence by the critic that qua conse-
quentialist he cannot, the debate will have to be about how integrity, or a
principle of distribution, is worked into the theory. Are these simply goods
among other goods (in which case they will often be overridden)? Or do
they have special weight or priority? How much weight? Any pluralistic
theory must attempt to explain how to cash out the metaphor of weight,
but then so too must a moderate deontological theory, under which conse-
quences may sometimes override deontological restrictions.
These considerations lead us to wonder whether there is much to
choose between the consequentialist who is not crude and the deontologist
who is not absolutist. We begin with a clear distinction: between the utili-
tarian who cares just about pleasure and pain and is willing to bite the
bullet when our intuitions about just distribution cannot be accommodated
on consequentialist grounds, and the absolutist who will not tell a lie even
to save the world. But most of us find neither view reasonable or adequate
to our moral experience. As we move away from these extremes, to plu-
ralistic and distribution-sensitive versions of consequentialism and to de-
ontological views that allow consequences to count for something, the phi-
losopher's labels "consequentialist" and "deontological" mean less and
58. See supra p. 551 (discussing Scheffler's position).
59. P. 26.
60. Until a decade or so ago, it was these problems about consequentialism-its apparent insensi-
tivity to matters of justice, its willingness to violate the integrity not of agents but of victims-that
preoccupied philosophers. The concern with the integrity of agents came to the fore with Williams'
critique. See supra p. 548.
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less.6" The credible versions of each converge to a kind of intuitionism in
which the rules are always prima facie and the various goods and bads,
values and disvalues that attract and repel us have to be balanced through
a process of judgment in every difficult case. In short, we find ourselves
describing a view that reflects the character and complexity of the dilem-
mas we confront and the choices we have to make.
VII.
Scheffler's fundamental question derives its force, I think, from its re-
semblance to a different question. Only philosophers wonder (and, I have
argued, largely for bad reasons) whether one is always morally required
to do what is best. Many people, however, worry about whether they are
doing enough-whether, given the misery and degradation of the lives of
millions of people, and the lesser but still serious misfortunes of many
more, their own affluence, comfort, and general well-being are morally
acceptable. They are disturbed not by the abstract question, "Am I per-
mitted not to maximize the good?," but by the concrete one, "How much
should I be doing to make other lives less miserable, and when may I
ignore all that and lead my own life?" Should I tithe, as the churches
recommend? Giving a twentieth of my income seems too little, a half may
be too much. There is, we feel certain, such a thing as too much, for
reasons Scheffler has explained. But how much is that, and how much is
not enough? Perhaps there is a line for duty, and a different line for
decency. We are interested in both.
These are the problems that really disturb us. They cannot be an-
swered abstractly, and so philosophers tend to avoid them. What is needed
to answer them? First we must decide whether we are interested in the
question for the isolated individual: What should I do given that everyone
else continues as before? Or the social question: What practices can be
legitimately demanded of people, given that the burdens are shared?
These questions have different answers.6 2 In addition, we will have to say
much more about the kinds of things that are good and bad; inevitably, we
will have to weigh them against each other, not a priori, but in the partic-
ular case. We may have to weigh "higher pleasures," not against lower
pleasures but against "lower pains": the non-necessary but nontrivial ben-
efits of advanced industrial society against the most primitive deprivations.
These are messy line-drawing questions; they involve looking at what is at
stake when a person gives up something to benefit someone in need, and
61. See Piper, A Distinction Without a Difference, 7 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 403, 403-24 (1982);
Stocker, Rightness and Goodness: Is There a Difference?, 10 AM. PHIL. Q. 87, 92-98 (1973).
62. See supra p. 553.
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at what is at stake for the recipient.
Given the world as it is, it is often easy to see just how much is at stake
for the beneficiary. It is the costs to the donor of doing good that raise the
most difficult questions. What aspects of a person's life are so important
that it would never (or almost never) be right to interfere with them?
Which are less serious or more contingent on general social practices? We
can, if we like, put these questions in terms of an agent's projects. But we
will have to do more than give it a name. Despite the central place of
personal projects in Scheffler's theory, nowhere does he mention a single
one, or distinguish among them. Yet we cannot begin to draw the lines, to
decide what it is reasonable to expect people to give, without distinguish-
ing among a person's many concerns and interests. I have no doubt that
Scheffier would agree.6" I only regret that he asked a-question whose an-
swer is clear-whether it is sometimes permissible not to maximize the
good-rather than the more difficult question: When?
63. See pp. 8-9, 20-21.
A Genealogy of Virtues
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. By Alasdair MacIntyre.
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Robert Wachbroitt
Alasdair MacIntyre's new book, After Virtue,' is a stimulating and in-
formed examination of moral theory and modern morality. These twin
concerns have been a standing feature of much of MacIntyre's writing,
making his work especially accessible and provocative. In After Virtue, he
presents a book-length treatment of themes touched upon in his essays,
collected in Against the Self-Images of the Age,2 as well as in his book, A
Short History of Ethics.- The result is a fascinating blend of intellectual
history and philosophical analysis. Most philosophers, I suspect, will fault
the book because of the sketchiness of many of the arguments, but the
book's chief value lies elsewhere. It challenges the reader to think.
Every age has its share of books lamenting contemporary morals; typi-
cally, such books are confident about the language of their lamentation.
Everything else may be in disorder, but the language of morality is not.
After Virtue differs from these books, for it questions the coherence of
much contemporary moral criticism.
I. The Emotivism of Modern Moral Culture
According to MacIntyre, the distinguishing feature of modern morality
is the presence of disagreement. Of course, disagreement over moral mat-
ters has always been with us. It is the character of modern disagreements
that presents a problem. Much of After Virtue is devoted to characterizing
the nature of such disagreements and explaining why their prevalence
should cause concern.
MacIntyre presents three examples of contemporary moral debate: the
morality of war, abortion, and justice and economic distribution.4 Each
t Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania.
1. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
2. A. MACINTYRE, AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE AGE (1971).
3. A. MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS (1966).
4. Pp. 6-7.
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argument in these debates, as distilled by Maclntyre, has a conceptual
purity. An argument constructed solely in the language of rights is pitted
against an argument expressed only in terms of utilities; an argument
based on equality against an argument based on freedom. Each argument
relies on a different network of concepts; therefore, there is little common
ground upon which a resolution can be based. As MacIntyre shows, these
rival moral arguments rest on different initial premises, and as a result
there is no rational terminus.5 In the end, the arguments face each other
like assertion and counterassertion. This is what MacIntyre regards as
distinctive of modern moral disagreements: Each disputant views the op-
posing argument not as a contender for truth, but as a rationalization of
different values and interests. Thus, any resolution of their dispute must
be nonrational.
This picture of contemporary moral debate is not meant to surprise
anyone. MacIntyre is impressed by the fact that many see in this picture a
deep insight into the nature of morality, a judgment that characterizes our
contemporary moral culture. MacIntyre calls both culture and picture
"emotivist." 8
Emotivism is usually understood as a theory of the meaning of evalua-
tive judgments: Assertions such as "This is good" or "That is the right
thing to do" are nothing but expressions of approval, equivalent to saying
"Hurrah for this!"'7 One of its distinguishing features is that it does not
recognize that moral assertions can contradict one another. For example,
if one person says "This is good," and another, "this is not good," an
emotivist would conclude that the two people are not in disagreement, that
one person is saying "I approve of this," and the other, "I don't approve
of this." If moral assertions are seen as mere expressions of approval,
there can be differences of opinion, but no contradictions. Emotivism en-
joyed some popularity in England and America during the 1930's and
1940's;' today, however, it is accepted by few philosophers.
Maclntyre's use of the term "emotivism" is somewhat peculiar since he
wishes to characterize a number of other conceptions of morality as emo-
tivist-some with a different theory of meaning, some with no apparent
commitment to any particular theory of meaning. The feature Maclntyre
extracts from emotivism is that if moral utterances are nothing but expres-
sions of approval, then moral claims are not the sort of things for which




8. The classic text is C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1945).
9. P. 19.
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beliefs cannot be the result of weighing reasons; any such change must be
nonrational. It must be a conversion. A fortiori, a refusal to change one's
moral views can never be a mark of irrationality. In short, morality can-
not be subject to rational assessment. MacIntyre finds this view in most
modern moral theories and he thus characterizes them as emotivist. For-
mulated in this way, emotivism is a theory about the justification of moral
statements, not about the meaning of such statements."
MacIntyre draws out two interesting aspects of this new formulation of
emotivism: the emotivist conception of society and social interactions, and
the emotivist conception of the self. The social content of emotivism is the
"obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-
manipulative social relations."11 Nonmanipulative influence requires that
the means used to influence be limited entirely to the giving of reasons. If
someone oversteps these limits, intending to influence on the basis of fears,
passions, or inattention, that person is not intending to influence ration-
ally; he or she is attempting to manipulate. But under emotivism, reason
has no place in moral considerations; thus, one no longer has a basis to
distinguish manipulative from nonmanipulative interactions.1" And just as
the original emotivist picture will strike many as representing a deep truth
about morality, so this social aspect of emotivism will strike many as an
unsentimental picture of the way things really are.
If reason has no role in moral deliberation, moral judgment becomes no
more than an expression of a nonrational choice. The essence of morality
becomes choosing or willing; any moral claim can be coherently accepted
or rejected by the moral self, since all that accepting or rejecting comes to
is choosing a particular moral point of view. Thus, moral claims are ex-
ternal to the moral self; this self shrinks to a point, becoming just a will."3
Social and natural constraints are constraints on the self's freedom; they
too are external to the self and not essential to the self's identity. In other
words, in the emotivist picture the self has no social content.
MacIntyre shrewdly observes that this conception of the self is shared
by writers as different as the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre and the soci-
10. This distinction is mine, not MacIntyre's. Rather, he tries to draw a distinction between emo-
tivism as a theory of meaning and emotivism as a theory of use, but unfortunately says too little to
make the distinction clear. Certainly, many would claim that there is nothing to the meaning of an
expression other than how the expression is used and that a theory of use therefore entails a theory of
meaning. Nevertheless, I think Maclntyre draws an important distinction, one better characterized as
between meaning and justification rather than between meaning and use.
11. P. 22.
12. If the distinction is nevertheless retained, it loses its original sense and becomes merely honor-
ific. For example, if someone accuses a politician of manipulating public opinion, all that person is
saying is that the politician has different political commitments.
13. There remains, of course, the question whether this will is free, whether the will is, so to
speak, pure or not, but that issue can be debated entirely within an emotivist framework. See Steven-
son, Ethical Judgments and Avoidability, 47 MIND 45, 47 (1938).
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ologist Erving Goffman."4 For Sartre, the self in its total freedom is dis-
tinct from any social roles it may take on. These roles are contingent and
external to the self; to think otherwise, as Sartre's famous waiter illus-
trates, is to be guilty of a kind of self-deception or bad faith.15 For
Goffman, the self is identified with a set of roles; the self is nothing over
and beyond the complex presentations of role-playing. 6 As MacIntyre
reads Goffman, however, no single role is essential to the self; thus, one
cannot distinguish roles that might be said to form the content of the self
and roles that are merely accidental to the self.1" Thus, while Sartre can
be read as saying that the self has no social content, Goffman can be read
as saying that there is no self to have a social content. This is a fine
distinction.
What evidence is there for MacIntyre's claim that contemporary moral
culture is emotivist? The moral disagreements he presents as typical are
said to be commonly found in "bars, barracks and boardrooms."'18 Yet, as
presented, they are untypically articulate, learned, and sophisticated.
More to the point, as representative data they have an unnatural concep-
tual purity. Whereas ideologues might strive for such purity, the common
person is more likely to hold to an amalgam of moral considerations con-
cerning both rights and utilities, liberties and equality, and so forth.
MacIntyre, nevertheless, is correct in describing much contemporary
moral talk as emotivist, but I think his warrant for this claim is to be
found in his discussion of characters, not in the debates he would call
typical of common parlance.
The characters of a culture are those social roles that constitute its
moral and cultural ideals and, as a result, are partially definitive of that
culture. To use MacIntyre's examples, the characters of the Public School
Headmaster, the Explorer, and the Engineer capture the moral culture of
Victorian England," whereas the characters of the Prussian Officer, the
Professor, and the Social Democrat capture the moral culture of Wilhel-
mine Germany.2" Contemporary culture also has its characters: the Rich
Aesthete, the Manager, and the Therapist.21 It is plain how the last two
characters embody emotivism:
The manager represents in his character the obliteration of the dis-
14. Pp. 30-31.
15. J. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY 58-60
(H. Barnes trans. 1956).
16. E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 253 (1959).
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tinction between manipulative and nonmanipulative social relations;
the therapist represents the same obliteration in the sphere of per-
sonal life. The manager treats ends as given, as outside his scope; his
concern is with technique, with effectiveness in transforming raw
materials into final products, unskilled labour into skilled labour, in-
vestment into profits. The therapist also treats ends as given, as
outside his scope; his concern also is with technique, with effective-
ness in transforming neurotic symptoms into directed energy, malad-
justed individuals into well-adjusted ones. Neither manager nor ther-
apist, in their roles as manager and therapist, do or are able to
engage in moral debate. They are seen by themselves, and by those
who see them with the same eyes as their own, as uncontested
figures, who purport to restrict themselves to the realms in which
rational agreement is possible-that is, of course from their point of
view to the realm of fact, the realm of means, the realm of measura-
ble effectiveness. 22
I think it is clear that we can recognize our culture in these characters.
II. Problems with Emotivism
MacIntyre raises three objections to emotivism: It signifies a loss of mo-
rality,2" it rests on fictions,24 and it is a stage of a "project" that wrongly
rejected an Aristotelian conception of ethics.2 Emotivism signifies a loss of
morality in that it feeds upon and sustains incoherence and disorder in
our moral language.2 6 Moral judgments are linguistic survivals of prac-
tices in which the status and meaning of such judgments was clear. Out of
context, the meaning of moral judgments becomes debatable, and their
justification, unclear.27 And it is a short step from confusion in language
to confusion in thought. The disorder touches all levels of discourse so that
all philosophical problems confronting various modern moral theories, not
just ordinary moral disagreements, become insoluble.28 But this may be to
attack the appearance and not the substance of the problem. If moral lan-
guage appears confused and incoherent, the blunt and more critical ques-
tion is whether we are not in fact better off without the language of mo-








29. Maclntyre offers the example of the word "taboo" in "eighteenth-century" Polynesia. Id. He
suggests that the language of taboos had fallen into confusion and incoherence. Taboo rules, deprived
of their original context, appear arbitrary, their interpretation and justification, debatable. Maclntyre
goes on to imagine how modern analytic philosophers would have disputed the meaning of "taboo" in
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emotivism. As MacIntyre paraphrases the point: "[M]y morality can only
be what my will creates. There can be no place for such fictions as natural
rights, utility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number.""0
This objection, as it stands, has little force. Emotivism, according to
Maclntyre, also rests on fictions. First, the justification of the characters
of the Therapist and the Manager, characters that exemplify our emotivist
culture, lies in their effectiveness or expertise, but this expertise is a
fiction. 1 The bureaucratic manager's expertise rests on a conception of
social science as a stock of law-like generalizations with strong predictive
power, butthere is an essential unpredictability in the subject matter of
the social sciences." This is a rich topic, but unfortunately Maclntyre
does not allow himself the time to discuss the replies his arguments invite.
Maclntyre also argues that the concepts of natural rights and utilities
that figure prominently in the irresolvable moral disputes of emotivist cul-
ture are themselves fictions:
The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such
rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which
we possess for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason
which we possess for asserting that there are no unicorns: every at-
tempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such rights
has failed.33
But as philosophers such as Paul Feyerabend and historians such as
Hugh Trevor-Roper point out, there are reasons underlying theories of
witchcraft and demonic possession, reasons that convinced intelligent and
sophisticated people as late as the sixteenth century. ' The best reason we
ways similar to their disputes over the meaning of "good." Is Maclntyre suggesting that the language
of taboos should have been reconstructed rather than dropped as it was in 1819?
30. P. 107.
31. See pp. 84-102.
32. P. 84. In addition, Maclntyre claims on the basis of Church's work that "it is a truth of logic
that the future of mathematics is unpredictable." P. 90. There is in fact no such truth of logic.
Church, Turing, and others showed that if we assume that a certain set of procedures completely
captures our notion of a mechanical decision procedure, then there is no mechanical procedure for
deciding, in general, the truth or falsity of mathematical statements. This assumption, however, is not
a truth of logic, and there is the possibility of nonmechanical decision procedures (as Kreisel has
suggested). Why should the predictability of the social sciences be restricted to mechanical
predictability?
33. P. 67.
34. It is ironic that Maclntyre is guilty of an insensitivity to historical contexts similar to the
insensitivity he complains of in emotivism. Although no intelligent person would now believe in witch-
es, in the sixteenth century many intelligent people did, not just the ignorant and vulgar. As Trevor-
Roper has remarked, few people were as learned, subtle, and sophisticated as Jean Bodin, and yet
Bodin thought he had good reasons to believe in witches. H. TREVOR-ROPER, THE EUROPEAN
WITCH-CRAZE OF THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 122 (1969). Concerning the signif-
icance of empirical evidence of witchcraft, see P. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: AN OUTLINE OF
AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 44 (1975).
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possess for asserting that there are no witches is that we have better rea-
sons for believing a theory that rules them out. If MacIntyre wishes to
employ a similar argument for rights being a fiction, he must show that
we have better reasons to accept an alternative theory. Otherwise, the ob-
jection looks like an incorrect application of an argument by induction. 5
MacIntyre regards the third objection to emotivism as the most impor-
tant and devotes half of his book to its development. He argues for an
Aristotelian conception of ethics that is incompatible with emotivism and
emotivism's Nietzschean extension. MacIntyre makes this argument by
presenting a reading of the history of ethics from Homeric times to the
present. This reading is important because, in MacIntyre's view, the fa-
vored version of Aristotelianism requires that we identify ourselves within
a particular tradition of moral inquiry.
Emotivism springs from a conception of ethics as a system of rules or
principles, of which particular moral judgments are applications. The ra-
tionality of judgment is understood to lie in the reasonableness of the ini-
tial rules. Possible foundations for these rules, to which various philoso-
phers have appealed, include desires or fears common to all men, reason
itself, and the phenomenon of willing or choosing.
In contrast, Aristotelianism springs from a different conception of eth-
ics, one that focuses on the nature of virtues rather than on the articula-
tion and defense of a set of moral rules. Instead of studying what it means
for a judgment or action to be morally correct, the Aristotelian studies
what it means for a person to be good, what character traits (virtues) a
person must possess to have and enjoy the good life."6 To talk about the
virtues, we must be able to make sense of the point or telos of a human
life, for the virtues are those traits that enable one to realize this telos.
For Aristotle, this telos was provided by his metaphysical biology.37 For
his Christian followers (notably Aquinas), biology was replaced by Chris-
tian dogma. By the sixteenth century, however, Aristotelian conceptions of
the human telos began to fall into disrepute. The rise of modern science
was greeted by Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo as a rejection of Aristotle's
35. Induction directs us to infer from an observation of a past regularity of an appropriate sort the
belief that a certain present occurrence continues the pattern. It would be fallacious, however, to
conclude that we should not believe present scientific theories just because past scientific theories have
been falsified. Similarly, it would be a fallacy to conclude that we have no reason to believe any
present moral theory just because past moral theories have been found objectionable. We could call
this the "Fallacy of Defeatism."
36. Whereas the first conception naturally invites questions about the justification of morality and
of epistemology, the other tends to questions about moral psychology. Why is integrity a virtue? Can
someone possess the virtue of courage and not possess the virtue of temperance? A virtue-conception of
ethics can be concerned with questions of justification, just as a rule-conception of ethics can be con-
cerned with matters of moral psychology, but typically neither conception stresses the concerns em-
phasized by the other.
37. P. 152.
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philosophy and science."8 Not only were the latest scientific discoveries in
conflict with the claims of Aristotelian science (as Galileo was so fond of
pointing out), but the very idea of a telos in nature, of explaining phe-
nomena in terms of "final causes," went against the mechanistic philoso-
phy that underlay the new science." The decline in the authority of
Christian dogma also undermined the persuasiveness of a Christian con-
ception of the human telos and the role of religion in a rational, philo-
sophical understanding of ethics.4 And, finally, the rise of "individual-
ism" was directly antagonistic to any single view of our telos. The belief
that different people have different desires, interests, and needs on which
the individual is the best authority rejects any standpoint that challenges
the individual's authority.
What follows, according to Maclntyre, is the "Enlightenment project,"
which has engaged moral philosophers from the sixteenth century on, the
task of providing a rational foundation to morality based on a conception
of human nature as it actually is. Ethics has moved away from an appeal
to a telos and, consequently, from any conception of a "man-as-he-could-
be-if-he-realised-his-telos."' 1 The many attempts at the Enlightenment
project have failed and, Maclntyre claims, had to fail.41 Unfortunately,
the sketchiness of his discussion again makes it difficult to assess his claim.
The failures cannot arise from these philosophers' lacking proofs for their
claims, since Maclntyre does not think that philosophical arguments must
take the form of proofs.' Nor can the failures be said to stem from a lack
of good or interesting philosophical arguments. Maclntyre would surely
acknowledge that Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard, regardless of how
wrongheaded he might think them, were not fools. Our nonantiquarian
interests in these philosophers surely consist in part in the challenging and
powerful arguments we discern in their work.
Some clarification of Maclntyre's claim might be found in his very gen-
eral account of why the Enlightenment project had to fail. Maclntyre ar-
gues that if we drop any appeal to the human telos, as philosophers un-
dertaking the Enlightenment project apparently did, the status and
function of ethical precepts become unintelligible. 44 But the ethical theo-
ries of Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard and the other "Enlightenment" philoso-
38. See E. BURTT, THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF MODERN PHYSICAL SCIENCE (rev. ed.
1954); R.S. WESTFALL, THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN SCIENCE: MECHANISMS AND MECHANICS
(1971).
39. E.A. BURTT, supra note 38, at 25-35.
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phers are not without a conception of the purpose and function of ethical
precepts. Is MacIntyre suggesting that this conception is incompatible
with the rejection of any appeal to the human telos? He is not clear.
Ultimately, his case against emotivism and the Enlightenment project
must rest more on arguments for his alternative rather than on objections
to failures of other ethical theories.
MacIntyre's alternative is an attempt to revive a theory of the virtues,
which comes in a three-part discussion of practices, narratives, and tradi-
tions. Since he does not wish to resurrect Aristotelian biology or the au-
thority of Christian dogma, the first part is concerned with establishing a
different conception of the human telos. For MacIntyre, this conception is
social and is rooted in what he calls a practice:
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity
are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of ex-
cellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that
form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excel-
lence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended.45
Thus, the arts, sciences, games, the making and sustaining of family life
are all practices; those acquired human qualities the "exercise of which
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices
and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such
goods" '46 are all virtues.
It is natural to ask for a justification of this conception of the human
telos. Since realizing the human telos means,' for MacIntyre, realizing the
goods internal to a practice, the answer to this question presupposes a
justification for a practice. Plainly, not every practice is justifiable, and we
might begin to wonder whether this crucial appeal to practices leads to
moral relativism. It must be possible to evaluate practices, but this may
seem problematic for a virtue-centered view of ethics if virtues are under-
stood in terms of practices. In other words, we must either be able to
disqualify some human activities as practices or accept the possibility that
acting virtuously need not always be acting rightly. The first alternative is
not very promising since it is difficult to see how "practices" could be
suitably defined without making the account circular. But if we take the
second alternative, as MacIntyre does,"' we must be able to explain what
this possibility means. Otherwise, our account of the virtues would be an
45. P. 175.
46. P. 178 (emphasis omitted).
47. Pp. 186-87.
Vol. 92: 564, 1983
Moral Theory
incomplete account of morality because it would not capture what it is to
act rightly.
This leads to the second part of the account, the need to place a practice
within a narrative to render it intelligible. By being placed within a nar-
rative, the raising of an arm can be understood as signaling a friend, hail-
ing a taxi, catching a ball. But to become intelligible, each of these narra-
tives must be seen as part of larger narratives. For example, arm-raising
cannot be made intelligible as hailing a taxi if it occurs in the middle of a
desert.
The narratives Maclntyre is particularly concerned with present
human life as a unity so as to provide a basis upon which a conception of
the good can be articulated. That conception can transcend the limited
goods of any particular practice. Thus, it can provide a benchmark from
which one can justify or criticize a practice. What kind of narrative links
birth to life to death into a coherent story? Maclntyre suggests a narrative
of a quest, a quest for the good.
MacIntyre tries to dispel the appearance of circularity in this proposal
by distinguishing a quest from an ordinary search whose objective can be
adequately characterized, such as a search for one's keys. The goal of a
quest is not fully characterizable before its completion, for a quest is in
large measure an education in the character of that which is sought. Thus,
most education can be seen as a quest. Accordingly, a quest for the good
may be intelligible without presupposing an account of the good. We can
now begin to say what, in MacIntyre's view, morally justifies a practice.
Practices form part of the narrative quest embodied in the unity of an
individual's life. The virtues, according to MacIntyre, are "those disposi-
tions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the
goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant
kind of quest for the good . . . .""' Nevertheless, if anything whatever can
count as a quest for the good, the threat of relativism seems still present.
For example, we can easily imagine a quest for the good that has, as a
part, the practice of slavery. Indeed, such a conception of the quest for the
good is presumably found in the works of Aristotle and his contemporar-
ies.49 The fundamental question remains, though phrased in new terms:
Can we rationally evaluate and criticize different conceptions of the good
and what constitutes persevering or failing in its quest?
This leads to the third part of MacIntyre's account, the need to relate
both the individual life and practices to a tradition. My social and histori-
cal context constrains the manner in which I exercise the virtues and un-
48. P. 204.
49. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS* 1253b-1255a.
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derstand the quest for the good. These constraints are not accidental fea-
tures of me, but rather are essential to my identity as a moral agent. They
constitute "the given of my life, my moral starting point."' 50 Thus, a fifth-
century Athenian general's conception of the good is and must be different
from a twentieth-century American academic's conception. One can rebel
against one's social and historical identity (one's moral identity), but this
"rebellion" must start from a certain point: "rebellion against my identity
is always one possible mode of expressing it."'5
1
Unfortunately, MacIntyre says little about tradition and the role it
plays in his account. It can easily seem that a tradition is little more than
the history of a practice, so that the appeal to tradition would not ade-
quately ground practices and narrative quests. A better understanding
might be had of MacIntyre's account if we focus on the particular tradi-
tion in which MacIntyre is keen to locate us, the tradition of moral
inquiry.
MacIntyre's reading of this tradition is much too rich and fascinating to
bear further summary. His main claim, which this reading is meant to
support, is that our moral tradition is primarily Aristotelian, notwith-
standing the past few centuries of anti-Aristotelianism. 52 This tradition
forms much of our moral identity; our moral attitudes and commitments
are intelligible and rational only when placed within that tradition. The
rejection of Aristotelianism is also rejection of the context in which our
moral attitudes and commitments make sense. Our moral vocabulary be-
comes fragmented and disordered. The failure of moral philosophy in the
last few centuries to regain order has led to our emotivist culture.53 Aris-
totelianism, however, need not have been rejected: MacIntyre's account of
the virtues is meant to be more than a contribution to the tradition of
moral inquiry; it is also an attempt to review and sustain the earlier Aris-
totelian context. One of the features of the tradition in which we are lo-
cated, especially the Aristotelian portion, is that not every conception of
the good can be rendered intelligible, not every narrative of a quest for the
good can be placed within the larger narrative this tradition embodies.
These are MacIntyre's central themes. We must now evaluate the suc-
cess of his account.
III. After Relativism
There are problems with MacIntyre's reading of our moral tradition.
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the medieval inheritance of the Aristotelian tradition, he writes:
When Giotto represented the virtues and vices in Padua he presented
them in pairs, and the pairs by their original and imaginative juxta-
positions suggest one more way of rethinking the Aristotelian and
Christian schemes. The most surprising of Giotto's pairings is at
first sight that of charity as a virtue with foolishness as a vice. But
then we recall that for Aristotle the highest virtue was wisdom, sug-
gesting thereby that charity was indeed a, or rather the, form of wis-
dom. Thus Giotto's visual representation of the vices both seems to
argue with and to presuppose the Aristotelian scheme. There could
not be more striking evidence of the heterogeneity of medieval
thought.54
Giotto made no such pairing. In the Arena Chapel at Padua, Giotto
painted frescoes of the seven virtues and, on the facing wall, the corre-
sponding seven vices. The virtue of charity is opposed to the vice of envy;
the vice of foolishness is opposed to the virtue of prudence. This is not a
large point but it is troubling in a theory that places great importance on
a view of our history.
There are more serious problems with Maclntyre's work; perhaps the
most important involves moral relativism, a view that has recently re-
ceived a number of different formulations in the philosophical literature. 55
One conclusion that all formulations draw is that moral disagreements
between appropriate communities-cultures, societies, historical
epochs-are not open to rational assessment. Different societies and times
have different conceptions of what it is to be well-dressed, but we do not
regard these differences as rationally disputable. The moral relativist
claims that our moral disagreements should be viewed in the same way.
Disagreements in our conception of the good are no more open to rational
assessment than disagreements in our conceptions of being well-dressed.
Plainly, relativism is closely connected with emotivism, as Maclntyre
understands it. Like emotivism, relativism holds that moral disagreements
between individuals cannot be resolved rationally. Indeed, without a sub-
stantial account of what makes a group a community, relativism collapses
into emotivism. Without such an account, moral disagreements within a
community look no different than those between two smaller communities,
so that by successive divisions the community can shrink to the individual.
Thus, if Maclntyre's position amounts to a moral relativism, he has not
54. P. 165.
55. See, e.g., B. WILLIAMS, The Truth in Relativism, in MORAL LUCK 132 (1981); Harman,
Moral Relativism Defended, 84 PHIL REV. 3 (1975).
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succeeded in providing us with a genuine alternative to emotivism."
MacIntyre's approach is to place the virtues in the context of practices,
to understand such practices in terms of the narrative unity of a quest for
the good, and to place that good within a broader narrative embodied in a
tradition. Prima facie, this account does not avoid relativism; it embraces
it: Individuals from different traditions cannot rationally dispute, much
less resolve, moral disagreements. One could reply, however, that we all
belong to the same tradition, and that this worry about relativism would
therefore not arise. And to be sure, all the people MacIntyre mentions, all
the moral standpoints he examines, belong to our moral tradition. But this
reply will hardly do. The Chinese, the Japanese, the Indians, and the
people of most third-world countries are not part of our moral tradition.
The worry about relativism is thus relevant.
Despite his familarity with history, sociology, and anthropology,
MacIntyre does not address this problem at all. Nor does he address the
similar problem of the change of morality over time. Clearly moral stand-
points change as traditions change; disputes among these changed views
also seem unresolvable. Unless Maclntyre can specify a tradition we all
share (which is doubtful), there seem to be only two lines of reply. One is
to say that people from different traditions or epochs share important
moral characteristics. How this line would proceed is unclear, but it is
clear that this sort of reply makes a significant step toward a universality
MacIntyre rejects. The shared features that allegedly constitute the core of
morality are obviously not particular to any moral tradition and, a forti-
ori, to any social or historical context. Arguably, this reply loses much of
the spirit of MacIntyre's enterprise. The other line of reply, more in
keeping with the spirit of After Virtue, is to say that while relativism is
true of our current situation, we can change this situation. What sort of
change would this be? Would it involve merging our moral traditions,
regarding other peoples as forming a community with us? How this line
would proceed is also unclear, but it is clear that there is no reason to
think that the resulting merger need resemble anything Aristotelian.
As it stands, After Virtue is an extremely suggestive and thought-pro-
voking book, but parts of it are very sketchy and, to that extent, uncon-
vincing. Toward the end of After Virtue, MacIntyre rightly recognizes
that his book requires a sequel. There are many people, this reviewer
included, who look forward to that book.
56. The natural way to avoid relativism is to argue for a universality as an essential part of
morality. This is what Kant and other modern moral philosophers have tried to do, and it is certainly
part of their intellectual pull that they took this natural approach to avoid moral relativism. It would
indeed be ironical if, as MacIntyre claims, this approach of avoiding relativism led to relativism's
cousin, emotivism. In any case, MacIntyre apparently has no sympathy for the aspirations of a moral-
ity to universality. See p. 119.
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William J. Currant
During the past few years, a great deal has been written about experi-
mental investigations using human beings as subjects. Dr. Robert Levine's
book, Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research,' for example, is one of
two recent guidebooks for members of the hundreds of human studies
committees, or "institutional review boards," as they are known in federal
regulations, that must examine and approve or disapprove clinical re-
search in hospitals and universities across the United States.2 There have
also been several fine books on the social context of medical research and
on the requirements of informed consent.' If only one book in this field
were to be read, however, I would suggest it be this one by Dr. Levine.
Since it is written by one person, rather than by a series of chapter au-
thors, it is better organized, less repetitive and more consistent in its view-
point than most multi-authored texts. It is also unusually authoritative.
The author is a medical investigator at Yale Medical School, a respected
clinical pharmacologist, and an editor of a leading medical research jour-
nal. Most importantly, he recently spent over three years on the staff of
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research. He is thus well qualified to discuss the
vast and sometimes treacherous morass of federal statutes and regulations
currently controlling clinical investigations.
Despite his close relationship to the research field, Dr. Levine does not
write as an apologist for his fellow researchers. He travels a straight and
fair path through the many ethical and regulatory standards governing
t Frances Glessner Lee Professor of Legal Medicine, Harvard University; Counsel, Warner &
Stackpole, Boston, Massachusetts.
1. R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (1981) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
2. The other is HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH: A HANDBOOK FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS
(R. Greenwald, M. Ryan & J. Mulvihill eds. 1982).
3. See, e.g., G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTA-
TION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA (1977); B. BARBER, INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY AND
RESEARCH (1980); THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF MEDICAL RESEARCH (H. Wechsler, R. Lamont-Havers
& G. Cahill eds. 1981).
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clinical research, a survey that is particularly important given the bad
press "human experimentation" has received in the last ten years. Indeed,
the field has been a favorite and sometimes vulnerable target for investiga-
tive reporters. There have been enough scandals and questionable prac-
tices to justify the media attention.
Given the criticisms that medical research is subjected to today, it is
easy to forget that this field once enjoyed a hallowed reputation supported
by romanticized stories of triumphs over human disease. Before Congress
entered the deep quagmires of Medicare and Medicaid, the federal gov-
ernment was satisfied to support medical research in a truly grand fash-
ion. Because the government did not bear the bulk of the financial burden
for the provision of direct medical care, it could, and did, give generous
support to biomedical research. But those days are over. Medical research,
the glamor stock of the past, has now become a "suspect" activity required
to prove itself every day. The low point came perhaps in 1974 when the
Massachusetts legislature passed a statute making "experimentation" on
the human fetus a felony, without even providing a statutory definition of
the term.4
At the outset, Dr. Levine explains his strong dislike for the term medi-
cal "experimentation." It is one of three concepts commonly used in the
field that he rejects as "unacceptable terminology."' 5 He does not seem to
reject the term because of the negativist baggage it has acquired in the
public eye, but because of the misleading implications the term conveys of
always involving "testing something" or "trying something out." Dr. Le-
vine asserts that such practices are more characteristic of medical practice
than medical research, since practitioners regularly adjust diagnosis and
treatment in seeking the best results for their patients. On the other hand,
modern clinical investigators are strictly constrained by the written specifi-
cations of the research protocol within which they are working.'
This Review focuses on two of the many issues raised by Dr. Levine's
book. First, it discusses ethical and fiduciary standards for the relationship
between researcher and subject. Second, it analyzes the manner in which
institutional review boards evaluate medical research proposals.
I. Medical Research, Ethical Norms, and Informed Consent
In a useful and fundamental chapter on ethical norms, Dr. Levine sum-
marizes what he describes as the generally accepted list of ethical require-
4. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1982). The statute defines "live
fetus," but not "experimentation."
5. P. 6. The other unacceptable terms are "therapeutic research" and "nontherapeutic research."
Id.
6. P. 8.
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ments for conducting clinical research: (i) good research design, (ii) com-
petent investigators, (iii) a favorable balance of harm and benefit, (iv)
informed consent of the subject, and (v) equitable selection of subjects.7 To
this list, Dr. Levine also adds an additional principle. He suggests that
monetary compensation be granted without fault for research-related inju-
ries to subjects. He asserts that such a principle has begun to appear in
some guidelines and he predicts that the requirement of no-fault compen-
sation will soon be added to federal regulations.'
A. Informed Consent as Contract
Dr. Levine's longest chapter is on the fourth requirement, informed
consent. He offers sixteen subrequirements for an adequate informed con-
sent.9 Dr. Levine grounds the requirements of informed consent in what
he calls the ethical principles of "respect for persons" 10 and personal "au-
tonomy."1" But he also observes that through informed consent the investi-
7. Pp. 13-22. Some readers may note the absence from Dr. Levine's list of one other commonly
accepted principle: the requirement that research on humans be preceded by laboratory and animal
investigation that indicates an acceptable chance of success and safety. Dr. Levine does not ignore this
principle, but notes it briefly as part of his first requirement of good research design. P. 14. In con-
trast, the two major international codes in the field distinguish the soundness of the research design for
human investigation from the adequacy of "animal- experimentation" (both codes use this term) that
precedes and must be found to justify a research plan involving humans. See p. 286 (Nuremberg
Code, principle 3); p. 288 (Declaration of Helsinki, basic principle 1).
The importance of the requirement of adequate prior testing on animals was recently underscored
by the impressive media attention given to the first transplant of a totally mechanical heart on Dr.
Barney Clark at the University of Utah Medical Center. Early media comment was euphoric. As the
patient suffered severe downturns and seizures and the left ventricle valve of the machine had to be
replaced, the New York Times, which had led the favorable national coverage with a full-time medi-
cally trained reporter, Lawrence Altman, on the spot, turned full-circle and published a scathing
editorial attack. The Times emphasized the institutional review board's responsibility to curb the zeal
of doctors who pioneer new operations but who may be "led by natural enthusiasm, or a passion for
the spotlight, to test them prematurely." The editorial asked, "Don't these failures suggest that the
review board should have required even more testing in animals before using a patient as guinea
pig?" Prolonging Death Is No Triumph, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1982, at A26, col. 1.
8. Pp. 118-23. At present, neither Congress nor the Department of Health and Human Services
has implemented such a program. One of the many requirements of informed consent, however, is
disclosure of the existence of compensation for injuries in any research project involving more than
minimal risk. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (1982). A presidential commission has recommended that the
federal government finance a few small-scale no-fault compensation programs. See 1 PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLI-
CATIONS OF PROGRAMS TO REDRESS INJURIES CAUSED BY BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 4
(1982).
9. Pp. 73-89. Lest this seem overly extensive, I would note that the latest federal regulations
contain at least as many different categories of information that must be conveyed to subjects. See 45
C.F.R. § 46.116 (1982). The information must be given in understandable language and the consent
cannot contain exculpatory language requiring a waiver of legal rights or liability for injury. Id. The
regulation also contains a set of conditions under which institutional review boards may waive some or
all of the elements. Id. § 46.116(c).
10. P. 70.
11. Pp. 91-92.
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gator and the subject enter into a contractual relationship. 2 That relation-
ship, when it exists, is certainly more one of law than of ethics.
While the reference to contractual theory is interesting, few arrange-
ments between investigators and subjects meet the formal standards of
traditional contracts. Indeed, the contractual model is useful to describe
the relationship between researcher and paid volunteer in physiological or
behavioral science projects; it sheds little light, however, on clinical
research.
In the clinical-medical area-the primary focus of Dr. Levine's
work-subjects are generally sick persons and the underlying contractual
relationship concerns the medical service offered and received. For such
persons, involvement in clinical research is almost always incidental to
their status in an already established doctor-patient relationship. The core
of the latter relationship is trust; the physician has a professional duty to
provide the best available medical care to the patient"3 and a fiduciary
obligation of fair dealing and truthfulness. The parties are not equal and
wary bargainers dealing at arms' length: The patient places great trust
and hope in the physician and surrenders a considerable degree of privacy
and personal convenience to receive the desired benefits of the treatment.
When the patient also agrees to become a research subject, he rarely
obtains any financial compensation.1 4 The patient is not bound by a con-
tractual "promise" to participate in the research throughout its course; his
involvement is essentially voluntary. The patient can withdraw from the
research project at any time, no matter how inconvenient for the re-
searcher, and the institution and the researcher cannot penalize him by
witholding medical services or improperly discharging him. In summary,
the relationship of patient-subject in clinical research does not fit comfort-
ably into a contractual model.
B. Informed Consent and Ethical Principles
More generally, the ethical principles of "respect for persons" and per-
sonal "autonomy," which form the basis for Dr. Levine's formation of
12. P. 93.
13. The basic foundation of the ethics of physicians is the Oath of the Hippocratic Physicians: "I
will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but never with a view to
injury and wrong-doing." 1 HIPPOCRATES 299 (W. Jones trans. 1923), reprinted in ETHICS IN
MEDICINE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS 5 (S. Reiser, A. Dyck & W.
Curran eds. 1977). Dr. Levine does not cite the Oath in his discussion of fundamental ethical princi-
ples, though he does quote Hippocrates' Epidemics for the proposition that when treating diseases,
physicians "help, or at least . . . do no harm." P. 10.
14. The patient is generally billed for hospital-day charges and services even if he participates in
a research program. He is not billed for the cost of test medications, however. Similarly, he should not
be billed if he overstays a hospitalization to continue in a study or if additional hospitalization is
needed because of a side-effect of the study.
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informed consent,1 5 are drawn more from general philosophy and ethics.
Because they do not derive from the applied canons of professional medi-
cal ethics, obligations, and expectations that have developed over many
centuries, Dr. Levine's discussion seems rather abstract and dogmatic. I
believe that the study of informed consent in clinical research would profit
from more attention to the applied ethical framework of the doctor-patient
relationship and the ethical standards developed around the added rela-
tionship of clinical investigator and patient-subject. Such treatment would
be consistent with the common-law approach to fiduciary duties and con-
tractual expectations, which interprets professional and business relation-
ships by examining the customs and practices of the fields themselves. In-
deed, the criticism of Dr. Levine's contractual model suggests why a
context-specific derivation of the ethical principles of informed consent is
desirable.
C. The Case for Disclosure
In his chapter on informed consent, Dr. Levine also turns to the ques-
tion of whether the case for full disclosure is more compelling in the ther-
apeutic relationship or the research relationship.' This discussion may
remind one of medieval debates about which religious order was the most
holy and virtuous, but it is analytically useful. Dr. Levine finds that the
general consensus is that clinical investigative efforts carry the greater ob-
ligation to disclose.17 It is interesting to find that Dr. Levine answers this
question by reference to accepted practice and the expectations of the par-
ties rather than through application of the more abstract ethical concepts
referred to earlier. Indeed, clinical subjects are often considered members
of the research "team" and thus entitled to all knowledge possessed by the
group's other members.
This collegial approach, however, does not adequately portray the sta-
tus of the unsophisticated, sick, anxious hospitalized patient asked to try a
new drug or procedure that may help alleviate ("has some interesting
promise") the condition or pain that patient has been enduring. In addi-
tion, the distinction itself seems unnecessarily formalistic. Recent legal de-
cisions concerning informed consent in therapeutic care support a high
degree of disclosure for all risks and discomforts "material" to a reasona-
15. This characterization is consistent with the work of the National Commission. See NATIONAL
COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 4 (1978) (noting that respect for persons requires treatment as autonomous
agents and protection of those with diminished autonomy).
16. Pp. 93-95.
17. Pp. 93-94.
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ble patient's decision to accept or reject therapy."8 It is not clear why there
should be a significant difference in the degree of disclosure required for
treatment and research. Different circumstances may create different de-
mands and call for individualized decisions in the patient's or the subject's
best interests, but the setting of clinical research itself should not affect the
basic duties owed a subject-patient.
II. The Role of Institutional Review Boards
The last chapter of Dr. Levine's work addresses the functions of insti-
tutional review committees and boards.1" As an aid in developing appro-
priate review procedures, Dr. Levine includes a rather detailed description
of the structure, administration, and practices of the Human Investigation
Committee at Yale-New Haven Medical Center,"0 a group Dr. Levine
has headed with distinction for several years. Scattered brightly among the
descriptive materials are items of sage advice concerning committee
operations.
Lawyers may be surprised by two practices at Yale. First, although
there is a procedure for disapproving protocols, the Committee "virtually
never labels a protocol disapproved."' Second, there is currently no for-
mally established appeal from decisions of the review group. According to
Dr. Levine, no system exists because there have been no requests for ap-
pellate review in his ten-year experience.22 These observations do not sur-
prise me. As chairman for many years of a Harvard review committee
and a member of several committees at large teaching and research hospi-
tals, my experience has been similar.
When the local review system was first developed, some commentators,
especially lawyers, were struck with the great potential for building a
common-law body of research-review principles and proposed elaborate
systems of national reporting of committee decisions and opinions. 23 These
18. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8
Cal. 3d 229, 244-45, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972); Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App.
217, 231, 367 A.2d 525, 533 (1977); Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 439 N.E.2d 240,
243 (Mass. 1982); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979). One state has adopted a similar





23. See Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, 98 DAEDALUS 387, 400-
01 (1969). For example, one study states that the decisions of review boards
should serve as precedents for future opinions. Thus publication would be a first step toward
case-by-case development of sound policies for human experimentation. We regard such a de-
velopment, analogous to the growth of the common law, as the best hope for ultimately provid-
ing workable standards for the regulation of the human experimentation process.
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AD HOC ADVISORY PANEL, FINAL REPORT 45 (1973).
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proposals have not been accepted and the review system remains locally
based and informal, although functioning under an expanded set of fed-
eral regulations dealing with procedural and substantive due process. The
early proposals fundamentally misconstrued the purposes and functions of
the local review bodies. Commentators assumed that the committees would
act like civil courts, hearing disputes on an advocacy basis and giving rea-
sons for their acceptance or rejection of particular projects. The system
has not developed that way. The review of proposals is a process of nego-
tiation, not confrontation.24
As Dr. Levine points out, an investigator usually approaches the review
group at an early stage in the development of his proposal. He may dis-
cuss an idea with the chairperson, the administrator, or a member of the
group, sometimes even before filing an application. Many committees ask
the investigator to be present when the project is discussed, to answer
questions, to listen to possible objections, and to react to them, but the
tone of the discussion is usually not adversarial. If problems remain, the
committee may postpone its decision, or it may approve the project on
certain stated conditions. If an impasse persists, the investigator can with-
draw the proposal, perhaps returning at a later time with a revised or
quite different proposal. Outright disapproval is rare.
As a result, investigators can view the board as a group of colleagues
striving to uphold ethical norms and to avoid harm to patients and sub-
jects. In contrast, if the adversarial model were prevalent, the review com-
mittees could be perceived as an obstacle to research, a tool of the regula-
tory system without value to medical science.25
Dr. Levine ends his book with wise advice for institutional review bod-
ies. He cautions them to remember that their success depends on their
own credibility within the institution. They must be perceived as exercis-
ing fair and independent judgment uncontrolled by the administration of
the institution. They cannot be seen merely as eager policemen of federal
rules, nor can they be constantly apologizing for all they do: "Don't blame
us; it is all the Fed's fault."' 26 The latter type of posturing, Dr. Levine
notes, not only undermines the authority of the committee, but also hurts
its ability to complain properly about undesirable federal requirements.
24. The review group has the power of rejection, however, and can use it to prompt uncoopera-
tive, inexperienced, or pompous investigators.
25. In an earlier paper, I predicted that few applications would be turned down and that a negoti-
ation system would develop under which investigators would withdraw questionable applications.
Curran, Governmental Regulation of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research: The Ap-
proach of Two Federal Agencies, 98 DAEDALUS 542, 586 (1969). I also argued that review commit-
tees should not be analogized to civil courts. Id. But see Calabresi, supra note 23, at 400-01 (sug-
gesting analogy to common law). Such committees are more like licensing agencies.
26. P. 227.
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Dr. Levine advises committees to operate in an atmosphere of trust that
will encourage self-policing within the research community."
I came to this book with a great respect for Dr. Robert Levine as a
physician and clinical investigator. I come away with renewed respect for
his scientific talent and a fresh insight into his capacity to help us develop
and maintain high ethical and regulatory standards in clinical research
involving human subjects.
27. Id.
